目標戦略を実現する利得値の設計に関する研究 by 北側 紘史 & Koji Kitagawa
R n Ú   f  Î  
 
µ»·Fw rsá kª{  sµ»·  ´Ç¡{s w an[Ù¸ 
¢    e `T Àb s¾¯c 1532024 
Ú  ã ² 
Methods of Utility Design for Rational Decision Making 
åfÔé² ®&u©$YSÓÒà$µ»æ 
 Î   
Z{sç./5=$	 &Èi$´Ï&I$sgXÝ#çvÛ./
5=>6B_çÑçÓÒq
´ÏÊº%	 $èHçL ÁÄ£t
à$µ»çZ{sÅ&xU$°z ­%$XÝH
Å"%$è£tç<+DÂ¥sQªÚ ,G=ªÚ	 >6B_%#ç
ÃçjÌÍ%$è%">6B&­	 µ»çÂ¥sç¬¨sç{s
XÝÏ"%$è%"q
ç./5=Ñ&²±#çÓÒÐ§"
Ïµ»y	 èµ»çZ{s&­	 ² jÌ&Ü$£t«m
ÓÒ¤&$è£t«mÓÒç;C)?å£t&L ÁÄæ&×x
ç² jÌ&u©$)E1E5(:ÓÒgã&è)E1E5(:&;C)?
£t&p_çjÌ&p$'+3@*G2Å$gãçZ{s$
Z¿ÓÒgã}³	$èÚ$£tçJ¹ä&t$èM;C)?
Ë^´«m$£tådª±£tæçMÆË^´«m$
£tå®±dª±£tæ$è[Æçâ\|l$oâ&P#ç
K¦!#)E1E5(:&I$ØvÕ./5=&'+3@*G2­	 â\|l>
6B&ç² jÌ&u©$'B-A0=&½$èÆçHÉ±t~_
	 çÞß¼!$)E1E5(:&Ntç£t>6B&xWç² jÌ&x
'B
-A0=&½$èVO±çZvÛ$>6B&½ç PI Zh&­	 9(G
784+Z¿&$² jÌ&u©$èçSP&­	 ¤
]&¶Ö$è 
 
Master thesis
Methods of Utility Design for
Rational Decision Making
Student ID ɿ 1532024
Name ɿ Koji KITAGAWA
Supervisor ɿ Associate Prof. Kiminao KOGISO
Date ɿ February 28th, 2017
Abstract
Control theory provides knowledge and techniques to allow a system to work as
expected. Extant studies focus on the knowledge and techniques related to the
modeling, analysis, and design of a system. This indicates the potential of devel-
oping decision making studies since there is a paucity of studies from the design
perspective, as most studies focus on the decision making model as an analytical
tool. The aim of this thesis involves proposing algorithms to solve design problems.
The problems involve designing decision making situations that involve equivalence
to compute an incentive that motivates decision makers to achieve desired actions.
This thesis discusses two diﬀerent models related to decision making, namely ratio-
nal and non-strategic decision making, and rational and strategic decision making.
In the former, each player maximizes an owned utility with respect to a non-strategic
situation. In the later, each player attempts to maximize his/her own utility for an
expected opponents’ action based on interaction between players. From the control
theory perspective, the design problem can be reduced to a control system design
problem because the incentive is considered as an actuator in the problem. The
problem is solved via the following steps: construct the model of the control object
and then design the feedback control system that includes a proportional and inte-
gral controller. Additionally, numerical simulations confirm the eﬀectiveness of the
proposed algorithms.
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1Chapter1
Introduction
This chapter states the background, objectives, and structure of this thesis.
1.1 Rational decision making
Control theory provides knowledge and techniques to allow a system to work as
expected. Extant studies mainly focus on the knowledge and the techniques of a
system including modeling, analysis, and design of a system. It is expected that
studies on rational decision making will be a new development, because they in-
troduce a control theory viewpoint. Rational decision making indicates that the
individual or organization determines his/her action to maximize individual happi-
ness or social welfare. This type of decision making is studied in microeconomics
and is formulated as a decision making model. The decision making model is used
in several fields including economics, biology, and engineering. However, a number
of studies consider the decision making model as an analytical model, and there is a
paucity of studies from the design perspective. Thus, in the present thesis, a design
method is considered to achieve a desired result by applying control theory. The
design method corresponds to computing an incentive that allows players (individ-
uals or organizations) to select a desired action. Two diﬀerent models related to
decision making are discussed in this thesis. The first model presents rational and
non-strategic decision making, which considers that each player maximizes his/her
own utility for a non-strategic situation. The other model discribes rational and
strategic decision making, in which each player attempts to maximize his/her own
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utility for the actions of expected opponents with respect to an interaction between
the player and the opponents. The two models of decision making are described in
detail below.
1.1.1 Rational and non-strategic decision making
This section states rational and non-strategic decision making as presented in a
price theory model in microeconomics. The theory is used to analyze a market mech-
anism based on a correlation between demand and supply and between consumers
and producers. Various models were studied, and a feature of the models includes
a market such as a labor market, an advertisement industry, a stock market, and
an electricity market. For example, a study examined the eﬀect of working families’
tax credit as a work support for families with children toward a labor market 2). A
study highlighted the indirect competition market that exists between advertisers
and viewers through the media 3). An extant study analyzed fluctuation in stock
prices based on actual data in a central European stock market 4). A previous study
considered a balanced regulation rule for emerging new industries in an industry
market 5). Additionally, a study also modeled demand response in an electricity
market and analyzed matching power supply and shaping power demand 6).
The present thesis considers the problem of an imbalance between demand and
supply in an electricity market as an example of rational and non-strategic decision
making because the imbalance imposes a cost to keep power plants in an electricity
company. Recently, eﬃcient use and generation of electric energy are important
topics because electricity consumption is increasing. From the viewpoint of eﬃcient
generation, a dispatch and pricing method was proposed to avoid the risk of power
imbalance from the electricity company viewpoint 7). However, it is diﬃcult to
achieve eﬃcient generator use, because the demand for electricity changes tempo-
rally, and thus it is diﬃcult to generally estimate the demand accurately. Each day
is divided into a peak period and an oﬀ-peak period. Electricity companies incur
considerable cost to maintain facilities to ensure stable supply throughout the day.
Therefore, it is necessary to decrease the number of non-operational facilities during
the oﬀ-peak period to the maximum possible extent. Thus, extant studies proposed
methods of demand response 8, 9, 10, 11, 12) or selling electricity 13, 14). Demand re-
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sponse aims to persuade consumers to change their consumption patterns to reduce
the demand gap between the peak and oﬀ-peak periods in order to ensure a stable
supply. To this end, a company could raise electricity prices by using strategies such
as Real-Time Pricing and Time of Use 11) or incentivize consumers who cooperate
by reducing consumption when the electricity gap is not balanced. The electricity
demand is expected to be uniform throughout a day when this type of method works
successfully. This would lead to a reasonable reduction in the number of facilities
necessary in peak periods and the cost of maintaining non-operational facilities in
oﬀ-peak periods.
In contrast, the present thesis focuses on selling electricity. An electricity com-
pany is obligated to fill the electricity demand-supply gap in the peak period by
employing a strategy of buying electricity from individuals or organizations that
store electricity. For example, individuals own solar power plants and energy stor-
age facilities. The individuals or organizations that store electricity are called farm
owners. They have adequate electricity, and the electricity company can purchase
it to compensate for electricity shortage. This thesis considers a situation in which
electricity selling occurs in a peak period. When an electricity company buys small
amounts of electricity from farm owners, the electricity price increases because the
price depends on quantity. Therefore, it is assumed that an electricity company can
use a persuasive dialogue system to negotiate purchase prices with the farm owners.
Thus, it is assumed that an electricity market includes the persuasive dialogue sys-
tem. From the control theory perspective, the persuasive dialogue system works as
an actuator to control farm owners’ decision making. Therefore, the market can be
considered as a controlled plant with the persuasive dialogue system acting as an
actuator.
The persuasive dialogue system is categorized based on the goals of the system.
These categories are introduced in the literature 1), like Fig. 1.1. In the figure, the
ellipse on the left side denotes a user’s goals with respect to a dialogue system. For
example, the dialogue system provides information useful to the user 1) and allows
the user to communicate with the system via chats 15). The ellipse on the right
side denotes the system’s goals of a persuasive system such as devising a promotion
system to sell products. The common area between both the ellipses denotes that
the goal of the persuasive dialogue system is to achieve both user and system goals
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Fig. 1.1: Categorization of dialogue systems 1)
by leading the user. An example of this type of a system includes an advisory system
that helps a student to select the best laboratory based on his/her requirements 1).
In this thesis, the persuasive dialogue system (the common area in Fig. 1.1) is used
to negotiate with farm owners.
1.1.2 Rational and strategic decision making
This section focuses on the rational and strategic decision making. A game the-
oretic model is studied in microeconomics and is capable of formulating a player’s
behavior in a strategic situation. The model is used to express rational and strategic
decision making. The present thesis considers a normal-form game, which is known
as a fundamental and most common representation of a strategic situation. The re-
sult of the game is represented as a type of equilibrium. The present thesis focuses
on the Nash equilibrium, which is the most general solution concept in a normal-
form game. The normal-form game is studied and used as a modeling and analysis
tool of a noncooperative game in several fields including biology, engineering, and
economics. For example, in biology, the emergence of individuals’ cooperation in
biological systems is represented by the snowdrift game and the prisoner’s dilemma,
16, 17) which are types of normal-form games. The sucrose metabolism is also ex-
plained by the snowdrift game 18). In engineering, the code review process in open
source software development is described as a snowdrift game between reviewers 19).
In a cloud network, a quantitative approach for a cost-benefit analysis of the security
on a cloud service is provided using a normal-form game 20). For mobile ad hoc net-
works, a normal-form game model is proposed to analyze the issue of the minimum
number of altruistic users necessary to sustain the network 21). In economics, a cor-
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relation among consumers who purchase or do not purchase remanufactured goods
is modeled as a normal-form game and the market share of remanufactured goods is
analyzed using the game model 22). The R&D (research and development) alliance
between a small firm and a large firm can be expressed as a coopetive game model,
which includes both a collaboration and a competition situation23, 24). A correlation
between a terrorist and a defender is formulated as a conflict game model 25). From
a diﬀerent viewpoint, a relationship between two countries targeted by terrorists is
represented as a prisoner’s dilemma 26).
Although these studies focus on modeling and analysis, it is important to study
a utility design problem from a diﬀerent viewpoint, namely systematic design. The
utility design problem aims to change players’ utility in a current game into an-
other ideal game that corresponds to the desired equilibrium. The new game is
then composed of the calculated utility that achieves the desired equilibrium. The
utility design is considered as a design problem of the control system because it
is possible to consider the change in utility as a type of an actuator to alter the
players’ behavior into desired behavior. Specifically, the algorithm is constructed
from a control theoretical approach. The proposed method is expected to provide
a presentation of reference models. The game is renewed based on the reference
to achieve the desired equilibrium. For example, extant research numerically in-
vestigates the biological phenomena of sucrose metabolism by adjusting the cost,
which is viewed as a parameter of the normal-form game 18). The study employs a
simulation-based approach to understand the phenomena, and thus trial and error
are required to determine appropriate parameters, and this is not eﬃcient. In the
code review reported in extant literature 27), knowledge transfer, increased team
awareness, and the creation of alternative solutions to problems can be considered
as benefits. The eﬀort of reviewing a code can be considered as a cost. The expected
reduction in the eﬀort that is necessary to fix the remaining bugs if the review fails
can be also considered as a benefit of the review. A possibility of making the code
review systems more eﬀective exists if the game designer is capable of changing the
benefits and the costs by rewarding points and recommending suitable reviews.
A few studies focus on revealing the utility or preference for a given equilibrium.
Previous studies focused on inferring player preferences or utilities for a given or
observed outcome in a matching theory, which is a part of microeconomics and
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involves resource allocation 28). An estimation of the preference or utility for the
equilibrium is termed as rationalizing or revealed preference. This type of an inferring
or rationalizing problem is also considered in network formulation 29). Furthermore,
inverse game theory problem is defined as a general rationalizing problem 30). These
studies did not include a utility design problem perspective. Additionally, they
focused on demonstrating computational diﬃculties (e.g., NP-hard, NP-complete,
etc.) but did not refer to the computation method or algorithm necessary to solve the
problem. In contrast, mechanism design enables the designing of rules or protocols
of an economic system (voting, auction, etc.) to achieve the outcome that satisfies
an objective such as maximizing a social welfare 31) 32). The mechanism is ineﬃcient
since it is manually designed based on analytical techniques. An extension of the
mechanism design includes automated mechanism design 33). This method realizes
an automatic design for the rule or protocol since the method formulates the design
problem for the rules or protocols as an optimization problem. The fore-mentioned
method and the method used in the present thesis diﬀer with respect to the aims.
The method used in the present thesis focuses on the utility design problem, which
enables to designate a specified NE.
1.2 Design problem
The objective of the present thesis involves proposing a computational algorithm
to achieve a desired equilibrium in rational and non-strategic decision making and
in rational and strategic decision making. Both decision making models are reduced
to design problems of the control system because the persuasive dialogue system
and the change in utility are considered as an actuator in each problem. The main
contribution of this thesis relates to the utility or proclivity (preference) computation
algorithm in the both types of decision making from the design perspective. The
algorithm can be generated using a control system design framework. Additionally,
numerical examples confirm that the proposed algorithm is capable of computing
the utility or preference corresponding to the desired outcome in several scenarios.
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1.2.1 Change of proclivity
The objective of the change of proclivity as stated in Chapter 2 is to provide
the electricity market model including a persuasive dialogue system that provides
information related to the proclivities of farm owners to achieve the desired elec-
tricity price. A situation in which electricity selling occurs in the peak period is
considered. When an electricity company buys small amounts of electricity from
the farm owners, then the electricity price should rise because the price depends on
quantity. Therefore, it is assumed that the electricity company can use the persua-
sive dialogue system to negotiate purchase prices with the farm owners. Hence, an
electricity market that includes the persuasive dialogue system is considered. An
electricity market model without the persuasive dialogue system is presented in ex-
tant literature 6). In the model proposed, the company manages the parameters of
the persuasive dialogue system that is installed in the premises of all farm owners.
The system serves the purpose of changing farm owners’ proclivities towards selling
and allows the company to balance the demand-supply gap. Numerical examples
confirm that the model enables the company to track electricity prices with respect
to a desired price by using the persuasive dialogue system.
1.2.2 Utility design
The objective of the utility design as stated in Chapter 3 involves providing a
computational algorithm for a normal-form game. The algorithm yields a utility
matrix corresponding to a desired NE. The main contribution of this study involves
the utility computation algorithm, which is obtained by applying the following con-
trol system design framework: nonlinear dynamics involving a correlation between
an NE and a corresponding utility matrix is modeled, stability analysis is performed
for the obtained nonlinear dynamics, and a tracking control system is designed to
converge the error between the updated NE and desired NE to zero. The non-
linear dynamics is obtained by using a similar technique that is derived by the
Karush-Kuhn-Tucker condition corresponding to a definition of best responses 34).
The system is expressed as a discrete-time, nonlinear, and autonomous dynamical
system. The model is theoretically guaranteed to yield updates of the NE and the
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corresponding utility matrix as well as to ensure their convergence to constant values
in a steady state. The results of the analysis enable to design the tracking control
system by incorporating a PI feedback controller while automatically adjusting the
amount of displacement in the NE until the error converges to zero. Additionally,
a numerical example confirms that the proposed algorithm is capable of computing
the utility matrix under several scenarios in desired NEs. To the best of the authors’
knowledge, the proposed algorithm obtained in the control-theoretic manner is novel
in the field of game theory.
1.3 Structure of this thesis
This thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 states the problem setting with
respect to the rational and non-strategic decision making and provides an electric-
ity market model and a computational algorithm to obtain a desired equilibrium.
First, elements of the electricity market model are explained and include the elec-
tricity company, the farm owners, and the persuasive dialogue system. Next, a
computational algorithm is proposed to achieve a desired equilibrium that is based
on a control system including the PI controller. Finally, the eﬀectiveness of the
proposed algorithm is confirmed by numerical simulations that include determined
and stochastic cases. Chapter 3 states the problem setting with respect to the ra-
tional and strategic decision making and proposes a computational algorithm to
achieve a desired equilibrium. First, the preliminaries and a utility design problem
are described. This is followed by deriving a transition model, which is theoretically
guaranteed to yield updates of the NE and the corresponding utility matrix, as well
as to ensure their convergence to constant values in a steady state. A computa-
tional algorithm is then provided to attain a desired NE, which is composed of a
control system including the PI controller. Finally, it is numerically verified that
the proposed algorithm enables the calculation of the desired utility that realizes
the desired NE in several scenarios. Finally, Chapter 4 concludes this thesis and
describes future works.
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Change of proclivity
This chapter describes an electricity market model that provides the desired equi-
librium. In this chapter, a selling electricity in an electricity market is considered
as a example of the rational and non-strategic decision making. The market is com-
posed of an electricity company which is obligated to fill a demand-supply gap, farm
owners who store electricity and is capable of supplying it to the company, and a
persuasive dialogue system which negotiates purchase prices with the farm owners.
In the situation, the market that is possible to control the farm owner’s proclivity
toward selling electricity is proposed.
2.1 Controlled Object
The controlled object is an electricity market composed of the farm owners and
the electricity company, and the persuasive dialogue system, as stated below.
2.1.1 Persuasive dialogue system
We consider a situation where an electricity company needs to compensate for
electricity shortage and farm owners have enough electricity to sell to the electricity
company. In this situation, we assume that the electricity company buys electricity
from the farm owners and that the price of such electricity depends solely on the
amount of electricity bought. The amount is decided by the farm owners’ proclivity
toward selling their electricity. Proclivity refers to the level to which they are willing
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Fig. 2.1: Eﬀect on the farm owner’s proclivity toward selling the electricity by the
persuasive dialogue system
to sell electricity to the electricity company. If the farm owners’ proclivity is low
and the amount of electricity sold by them to the electricity company is small, the
electricity price rises. In short, the electricity price depends on the farm owners’
proclivity to sell.
However, the electricity company would prefer avoiding hikes in the electricity
price and control the electricity price to avoid increasing the cost. To this end,
the company must manage to persuade the farm owners to increase the amount of
electricity they sell. Negotiation with the farm owners to increase their proclivity
toward selling their electricity to the company is one of the ways to achieve the
goals.
The persuasive dialogue system is introduced into each farm owner’s house to
facilitate negotiations. The following three conditions are assumed in this thesis.
First, each farm owner determines the amount they want to sell, based solely on
the proclivity toward selling electricity. Second, there exists a linear relationship
between the amount of electricity sold by the farm owners, qi, and the electricity
price, p. The inclination of this linear line is defined as a proclivity, bi, and the
relationship is written as qi = bip. Third, the eﬀect of the persuasive dialogue on
the farm owners’ proclivity is expressed quantitatively. A real proclivity would be
more complex; for example, no farm owner would sell the electricity to the company
unless the unit price exceeds some standard. However, we assume that the linear
relationship exists in the appropriate vicinity. Hence, the electricity company might
deliberately not decrease the electricity price in this model. Fig. 2.1 shows the linear
relationship between the amount of electricity, qi, which the farm owners sell to
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Fig. 2.2: Outline block diagram of whole model
the company, and the electricity price, p. The black line’s inclination represents
the j-th farm owner’s proclivity toward selling their electricity without applying the
persuasive dialogue system, bj. In contrast, the inclination of the gray line represents
the farm owners’ proclivity toward selling their electricity when subjected to the
persuasive dialogue system, bj + g(u). An increase in the proclivity yields a greater
amount of electricity, qj+p0g(u), which leads to a decrease in the price. Accordingly,
the desired price is achieved by controlling the farm owners’ proclivity. In addition,
two scenarios for acceptance to negotiation are assumed. In the first scenario, it is
assumed that farm owners always accept negotiation from the persuasive dialogue
system. In the second scenario, it is assumed that they accept negotiation from the
system probabilistically. Such behavior is written with a Bernoulli process, as will
be explained in Section 2.1.2.
2.1.2 Electricity market model
The electricity market is composed of n farm owners, the electricity company and
the persuasive dialogue system. The farm owners have enough electricity to sell to
the electricity company. The electricity company does not have enough electricity
to supply to the consumers and needs to buy the electricity from the farm owners
to compensate for the shortage.
The entire model is shown in Fig. 2.2. The electricity company buys the electricity
from the farm owners, and in exchange pays a set price to the farm owners. The
price depends on the farm owners’ proclivity toward selling their electricity. How-
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ever, the electricity company would like to control the electricity price to keep the
procurement cost down. When the electricity company introduces the persuasive
dialogue system, it is able to buy electricity close to the desired price. The eﬀect of
persuasive dialogue is adjusted by the company.
The electricity market model is formulated as the following optimization problem:
max
q≥0
n∑
i=1
−Ci(qi − pg(u)ωi), (2.1a)
s.t.
n∑
i=1
(qi − pg(u)ωi) = d, (2.1b)
where Ci(x) is the i-th farm owner’s cost function, which is assumed to be convex
in x, qi is the amount of electricity that can be sold by the i-th farm owner, q is
the vector consisting of qi, p is the unit price of electricity, u is an input into the
persuasive dialogue system, g(u) is the eﬀect of persuasive dialogue on farm owners’
proclivity toward selling electricity, pg(u) is the increase in the amount of electricity
sold on account if the farm owners accept the negotiation, and ωi is a function taking
0 or 1 based on the given probability according to the following:
ωi =
{
1 with probability s ,
0 with probability 1− s ,
(2.2)
where d denotes the demand-supply gap. For a given electricity price p, each farm
owner has the proclivity toward selling electricity bi and decides the amount of
electricity to sell qi to maximizes his/her evaluation function. Hence, the decision
variable in the problem (2.1) is q.
The optimization problem (2.1) consists of each farm owner’s decision making
and the electricity company’s equality constraint, as described in the following para-
graphs.
2.1.2.1 Farm owner model
It is assumed that the farm owners have enough electricity to sell to the electricity
company, and two scenarios are considered for the farm owners’ property. In the
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first scenario, they always accept negotiation from the persuasive dialogue system
(ωi = 1), while in the second scenario, they accept negotiation from the system
probabilistically (ωi = 1 with probability s,ωi = 0 with probability 1 − s). We
consider that each farm owner decides the quantity of electricity he/she wants to
sell to maximize his/her evaluation function. The amount of electricity sold, qi, is
the solution to the following optimization problem:
max
qi≥0
p(qi(bi, p)− pg(u)ωi)− Ci(qi(bi, p)− pg(u)ωi), (2.3)
where bi denotes the farm owner i’s proclivity toward selling electricity. Summarizing
all of farm owners’ evaluation function in the market with the respect to i, we have
the following:
max
q≥0
pd−
n∑
i=1
Ci(qi − pg(u)ωi),
where pd is independent of the decision variable, and the evaluation function of the
electricity market is given by (2.1a).
2.1.2.2 Electricity company model
The electricity company only has the facility to supply electricity to consumers
in the oﬀ-peak period. However, the company must maintain balance between elec-
tricity demand and supply. To this end, the total amount of electricity purchased
from the farm owners must coincide with the amount of electricity shortage. The
condition that the company must achieve is as follows:
n∑
i=1
(qi(bi, p)− pg(u)ωi) = d, (2.4)
and the equation is satisfied when its solution is the equilibrium point of the opti-
mization problem. The equality constraint (2.1b) is given by (2.4). From the above,
we can formulate the entire electricity market by (2.1).
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2.2 Numerical Calculation Algorithm
2.2.1 Optimal Condition of Solutions
This section states the optimal condition for (2.1), which is equal to that for (2.3).
Since the objective function of (2.3) is convex in qi, the following optimal condition
holds:
C˙i(q
∗
i (bi, p)− pg(u)ωi)− p = 0 ∀qi ∀i, (2.5)
where C˙i(bi) =
dCi(bi)
dbi
, and q∗i denotes the optimal solution to the optimization
problem (2.3). Noting qi ≥ 0, the optimization (2.3) can be transformed into the
following:
q∗i = argmax
qi≥0
p(qi − pg(u)ωi)− Ci(qi − pg(u)ωi),
= max({0} ∪ {qi|C˙i(qi − pg(u)ωi) = p}),
= [(C˙i)
−1(p) + pg(u)ωi]+, (2.6)
where [a]+ is the function that returns 0 if a < 0, and a otherwise.
2.2.2 Numerical Solution to the Optimization Problem
We use the dual gradient algorithm 6, 35) to solve the optimization problem (2.1).
First, to update the electricity price, the following equation is expressed in the k-th
iteration by using (2.1b).
p(k + 1) =
[
p(k)− γ
(
n∑
i=1
(bi(k)− g(u)ωi(t))p(k)− d
)]+
, (2.7)
where γ indicates the step size, which aﬀects the electricity price convergence speed.
t is a time step in a control loop. Second, (2.6) is transformed considering each farm
owner’s proclivity toward selling energy bi. In the k-th iteration, proclivity bi(k) is
described as follows.
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bi(k) =
⎡⎢⎣
(
C˙i
)−1
(p(k))
p(k)
+ g(u)ωi(t)
⎤⎥⎦
+
. (2.8)
This is the update of the proclivity. Finally, because we calculate (2.7) and (2.8),
the optimal solution q∗i = bi(k)p(k) ∀i is obtained when p(k + 1) = p(k) is satisfied.
2.2.3 Feedback Control
We use a PI controller so that the electricity price converges to the desired price
p. The controlled object is the entire electricity market, including the persuasive
dialogue system. The aforementioned PI controller takes the error of the electricity
price as an input.
To ensure that the electricity price converges to the desired price, the persuasive
dialogue system must change the farm owners’ proclivity toward selling the elec-
tricity at an appropriate price. The eﬀect on the persuasive dialogue system on
proclivity g(u) is defined as −u, that is, g(u) := −u. u(t) at step t is given by the
following:
u(t) = KP (p− pout(t)) +KI
t∑
i=0
(p− pout(i)),
where p is the desired price, pout is the price when p(k + 1) = p(k) holds at step t,
and KP and KI denote the proportional and integral gains, respectively. Actually,
the eﬀect of the persuasive dialogue system on proclivity is more complex, but
we consider the fundamental case. An overview of the algorithm including the PI
controller is shown in Table 1. A block diagram of the entire system is drawn in
Fig. 2.3, where bi indicates each farm owner. The broken line in the figure shows
the controlled object. Especially, the persuasive dialogue system works as a kind of
actuator for controlling the farm owners’ proclivity.
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Algorithm 1 Algorithm for computing the electricity market model
1: function –(b1, b2, ..., bn, p)
2: while p(k) ̸= p do
3: while d ̸= Q do
4: bi(k)←
⎡⎢⎣
(
C˙i
)−1
(p(k))
p(k)
+ g(u)ωi(k)
⎤⎥⎦
+
5: p(k + 1)←
[
p(k)− γ
(
n∑
i=1
(bi(k)− g(u)ωi(t))p(k)− d
)]+
6: Q←
n∑
i=1
bi(k)p(k)
7: k ← k + 1
8: end while
9: pout(t)← p(k)
10: u(t)← KP (p− pout(t)) +KI
t∑
i=1
(p− pout(i))
11: g(u)← −u
12: t← t+ 1
13: end while
14: return p = pout(t), b1, b2, ..., and bn
15: end function
2.3 Numerical Simulation Results
To confirm whether the electricity price converges to the desired price, we perform
a numerical simulation in four scenarios.
In the first scenario, the electricity company does not use the persuasive dialogue
system. In the second scenario, the electricity company is assumed to know all farm
owners’ cost functions and to use the persuasive dialogue system. The farm owners
always accept the negotiation. The i-th farm owner’s cost function is expressed in
Ci ∀i. In the third scenario, it is assumed that the electricity company does not
exactly know the farm owners’ cost functions. In other words, the farm owners’
cost functions that the company knows, include modeling errors. The company uses
the persuasive dialogue system and the farm owners always accepts negotiation.
In the forth scenario, the electricity company uses the persuasive dialogue system
with modeling errors in the situation where the farm owners accept negotiation
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Fig. 2.3: Block diagram of the electricity market system
probabilistically. In all scenarios, there are 10 farm owners in total, and their cost
functions are expressed as follows:
Ci = 0.1x
4, i = 1, 2, 3, (2.9a)
Ci = 0.2x
4, i = 4, 5, 6, (2.9b)
Ci = 0.15x
4, i = 7, 8, 9, 10. (2.9c)
The initial electricity price p(0) is 32, and the desired price p is 28. The shortage
amount of electricity d is 40. The step size γ is 0.05. The eﬀect of persuasive
dialogue is g(u) = −u. The PI controller gains are set to KP = KI = 1.0 × 10−4.
MATLAB 2015a was used for the numerical simulation.
The first scenario in which the electricity company does not introduce the per-
suasive dialogue system into the electricity market is considered. The solution is
obtained by solving the optimization problem (2.1) with g(u) = 0. The result is
shown in Fig. 2.4. The figure shows the process of finding the optimal solutions.
Fig. 2.4 a) expresses a control input into the persuasive dialogue system. Fig. 2.4 b)
shows that the electricity price p converges to 36.6162. Fig. 2.4 c) illustrates the lack
of the amount of the electricity. Fig. 2.4 d) expresses the farm owners’ proclivity
toward selling energy. These results indicate that the electricity price should be
36.6162 to compensate for the electricity shortage, the amount of which is 40.
The second scenario is where the electricity company knows the farm owners’ cost
functions Ci (2.9) correctly. Moreover, it introduces the persuasive dialogue system
into the electricity market, and the farm owners always accept negotiation. The
feedback control is applied to the system. If the following inequalities hold, then
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Fig. 2.4: Deterministic simulation result with no controlling
the equality constraint (2.1b) can be satisfied.
−ϵ ≤
n∑
i=1
(qi(bi, p)− pg(u)ωi)− d ≤ ϵ, (2.10)
where ϵ = 10−10. The result is shown in Fig. 2.5. Fig. 2.5 c) expresses the values near
the upper bound in (2.10). Fig. 2.5 b) shows that the electricity price decreases and
converges to the desired electricity price 28. As the price decreases, the farm owners’
proclivity toward selling energy bi increases by the eﬀect of the persuasive dialogue.
Therefore, controlling the farm owners’ proclivity makes the price converge to the
desired price in electricity market with the persuasive dialogue system.
The third scenario where the electricity company does not exactly know the farm
owners’ cost functions (2.9) and where the farm owners always accept negotiation.
The electricity company considers the following equations as the farm owners’ cost
functions:
Ci = 0.15x
4, i = 1, 2, 3, (2.11a)
Ci = 0.25x
4, i = 4, 5, 6, (2.11b)
Ci = 0.1x
4, i = 7, 8, 9, 10, (2.11c)
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which are diﬀerent from the correct equations (2.9). The result is shown in Fig. 2.6.
Fig. 2.6 b) indicates that the electricity price, pout, converges to the desired electricity
price 28. Therefore, the feedback control system is robust against the modeling
errors in the cost functions.
The fourth scenario that the electricity company uses the persuasive dialogue
system with modeling error in the situation where the farm owners probabilistically
accept negotiation is analyzed. In this scenario, four patterns are considered. Two
farm owners accept negotiation (the other eight always accept negotiation) at 70%
and 30% (s = 0.7 and 0.3 in (2.2)), and eight farm owner accept negotiation (the
other two always accept negotiation) at 70% and 30%(s = 0.7 and 0.3 in (2.2)).
The other parameters are the same as those in the third scenario. The results are
shown in Figs. 2.7-2.10 and the average and the variance of the electricity price are
summarized in Table 2.1. The average is taken in steps, which is defined as follows:
m =
1
1000− 500
1000∑
t=501
pout(t),
wherem is the average price. The variance in the desired price indicates the variance
from the desired price, and is assumed that the electricity prices after time step 501
is in steady-state. It is calculated by the following equation:
V ′ =
1000∑
t=501
(pout(t)− p)2 =
1000∑
t=501
{(pout(t)−m)− (p−m)}2 ,
=
1000∑
t=501
(pout(t)−m)2 + 500(p−m)2 ,
= V + 500(p−m)2 ,
where V ′ is the variance from the desired price, pout(t) is the electricity price at step
t and V is the variance from the average price. Table 2.1 shows that the diﬀerence
between the average electricity price and the desired price (p = 28) is at most on
the order of 10−2. It would be appropriate to consider that each electricity price
converges to the desired price in terms of the average. However, the variance in the
desired price increases gradually as the uncertainty increases. The uncertainty also
increases when the number of farm owners who probabilistically accept negotiation
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increases and the probability of accepting negotiation decreases.
Table 2.1: Average and variance of electricity price
Situation Average price Variance in desired price
Deterministic case 28 0
2 people, 70% 28.0035 0.2015
2 people, 30% 27.9974 0.2432
8 people, 70% 28.0111 1.4170
8 people, 30% 27.9941 3.3565
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Fig. 2.7: Probabilistic simulation result with modeling error (2 farm owners, 70%)
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Fig. 2.8: Probabilistic simulation result with modeling error (2 farm owners, 30%)
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Fig. 2.9: Probabilistic simulation result with modeling error (8 farm owners, 70%)
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Chapter3
Utility design
This chapter refers to the utility design problem. First, explain problem setting
about the utility design problem. Second, refer to a transition model, which is theo-
retically guaranteed to yield updates of the NE and the corresponding utility matrix,
and prove to converge strategy value to constant values in a steady state. Third,
provide a computational algorithm to achieive a desired NE, which is composed of
a control system applied the proportional and integral (PI) controller. Finally, con-
firm numerically that the proposed algorithm enables to calculate the desired utility
corresponding to the desired NE in severals scenarios.
3.1 Problem Setting
3.1.1 Preliminaries
This section provides notations to describe a normal-form game in this thesis.
The player, action, and utility of the game are respectively defined as follows: a
player: i ∈ N := {1, 2}, an action of the player i: ai ∈ Ai := {a, a}, and a utility of
the player i: ui ∈ ℜ, which are arranged in following utility matrix:
Ui :=
⎡⎣u11i u12i
u21i u
22
i
⎤⎦ ∀i ∈ N . (3.1)
In order to deal with it easily, let us define the diﬀerences between the components
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of the utility matrix (3.1) as
d1i := u
11
i − u21i d2i := u12i − u22i ∀i ∈ N , (3.2)
and also define another diﬀerence between them as
d3i := d
1
i − d2i ∀i ∈ N . (3.3)
Hence, the utility matrix (3.1) is described using (3.2) as follows:
Ui :=
⎡⎣ u11i u12i
u11i − d1i u12i − d2i
⎤⎦ ∀i ∈ N . (3.4)
For the technical reason, it is impossible to manage the matrix including d1i = 0 or
d2i = 0, we suppose the utility’s structure like (3.4) to introduce the control-theoretic
algorithm for the utility design. These restrictions are remained as future work.
Using notations Ui ∈ ℜ2×2 and A := A1 ×A2, the normal-form game is denoted
as G(N ,A, Ui). In addition, it is assumed that the player’s decisions are made
depending on a mixed strategy over the player’s action set. Then, we introduce the
strategy of player i as si ∈ Π(Ai) ∀i ∈ N , where Π(Ai) means a set of probability
distributions over player i’s action set, that is: ∀i ∈ N ,
si :=
⎡⎣si(a)
si(a)
⎤⎦ , si(a) + si(a) = 1,
si(a) ≥ 0, and si(a) ≥ 0. (3.5)
When a profile of the mixed strategy is denoted as s = (s1, s2), an NE is denoted as
s∗ = (s∗1, s
∗
2). It is well known that there exists at least one NE for G 36).
3.1.2 Utility Design Problem
This section formulates a utility design problem for a two-players, two-actions
normal-form game. We assume that there is a game designer who can manage a
system of G(N ,A, Ui) and is capable of adjusting utility values to motivate the
players to decide their diﬀerent actions, such as a reward. If a game outcome can be
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characterized by an NE and the game designer is not supposed to satisfy the current
outcome, then the designer would consider a new game with his/her desired NE
(reference), denoted as s¯∗, by changing the original utility matrix into an appropriate
matrix, denoted as U¯i, where s¯∗ ̸= s∗ and U¯i ̸= Ui hold. In this chapter, then, the
utility design problem is formulated as follows: for a normal-form game G(N ,A, Ui)
for given s¯ ̸= s,
find U¯i s.t. s¯
∗ is an NE of G(N ,A, U¯i).
This thesis is focused on the way to construct a computational algorithm that learns
utility matrix U¯i, and it attempts to solve the utility design problem.
In addition, from the resulting utility matrix, we can calculate an additional
utility (payoﬀ) matrix, defined by ∆Ui := U¯i−Ui ∈ ℜ2×2, which the designer needs
to prepare to learn the new game.
3.2 Controlled Object
This section presents a dynamics for normal-form games. We use a control-
theoretic design framework. In the control-theoretic manner, first, we consider a
mathematical model of dynamics of a plant to be controlled.
3.2.1 Update Rule of the NE and the Utility
To take a control-theoretic approach, we need a mathematical model related to the
normal-form game. However, because the game is static, such a dynamical model
has not been proposed as far as the authors know. Therefore, we must create a
model that dynamically expresses the key factors of the normal-form game. Now, in
the case of a finite Bayesian game, the technique is known: from certain equations
of player’s beliefs and Bayesian NEs, we can derive an update rule of the belief
and corresponding Bayesian NE in the form of a nonlinear, autonomous, dynamical
system 34). The technique derives an update rule of the NE and the utility matrix.
To do that, first, we derive a key lemma which is presented below. Hereafter, the
asterisks denoting the NE are dropped for simplicity.
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Lemma 1 For the normal-form game G(N ,A, Ui) with dji ∀j ∈ J ∀i ∈ N of (3.2)
and (3.3), if NE s = (si, s−i) satisfies 0 < s−i(a) < 1 ∀i ∈ N , then the following
equation holds:
d3i s−i(a) + d
2
i = 0 ∀i ∈ N . (3.6)
Proof 1 In the literature 34), similar equations are derived for a two-player two-
action Bayesian game with two types, where the player’s belief is defined as a
probability distribution over the two types, that is, µi ∈ Π(Θi) ∀i ∈ N , where
Θi := {θ, θ} ∀i ∈ N . Then, by restricting the beliefs to µ1 = µ2 = [1 0]T , the
resulting game that corresponds to (θ1, θ2) = (θ, θ) is coincided with a standard
normal-form game. Therefore, in this proof, we try to derive equations (3.6) from
its counterpart in the Bayesian game setting.
For the Bayesian game with two types, θi ∈ Θi, and their beliefs, µi ∈ Π(Θi), the
Bayesian NE s∗ that does not include pure strategies satisfies the following equations:[
1 −1
] [
Ui(θi, θ)s−i(θ) Ui(θi, θ)s−i(θ)
]
ψ(θi)p(µ) = 0,
∀θi ∈ Θi ∀i ∈ N , (3.7)
where setting µi =
[
1 0
]T ∀i ∈ N obtains p(µ) = [1 0 0 0]T , ψ(θ)p(µ) =[
1 0
]T
, and ψ(θ)p(µ) =
[
0 0
]T
. For further details about the notations, please
see the previous work 34). Using these values and definitions of (3.1)–(3.3), equations
(3.7) are written into ∀i ∈ N as follows:
[
1 −1
] [
Uis−i ∗
] [1
0
]
= 0,
⇔ u11i s−i(a) + u12i s−i(a)− u21i s−i(a)− u22i s−i(a) = 0,
⇔ (u11i − u21i )s−i(a) + (u12i − u22i )s−i(a) = 0,
⇔ d1i s−i(a) + d2i {1− s−i(a)} = 0,
⇔ (d1i − d2i )s−i(a) + d2i = 0,
⇔ d3i s−i(a) + d2i = 0,
where notation ∗ denotes an appropriate two-dimensional vector. Therefore, the last
equations are the same as the ones in (3.6). This terminates the proof of Lemma 1.
Chapter3 Utility design 28
An original idea of creating the model is stated below. A specification of behavior
is given to diﬀerences dji and s−i of an NE, appearing in (3.6), for extending them
to make them time-dependent variables. Let us introduce displacements δdji and
δs−i(a) corresponding to d
j
i and s−i(a), respectively. If the diﬀerences d
j
i change to
a diﬀerent value dji +δd
j
i , where δd
j
i is the displacement related to the utility matrix,
then there must exist the corresponding displacement δs−i(a) so that s−i(a)+δs−i(a)
results in an NE. That is, there exists a correlation between the diﬀerences and
the NE, and there must exist a certain map from (dji , s−i(a)) satisfying (3.6) to
(dji + δd
j
i , s−i(a) + δs−i(a)) satisfying (3.6) as well. Therefore, it is significant to
find the map because it can be viewed as a dynamical system, which becomes a
controlled plant.
Based on the idea, we model the dynamical correlation between the NE and the
diﬀerences. By defining the NE and the diﬀerences as time-dependent variables using
the notation ·ˆ, we consider the following update rule in the form of a discrete-time,
nonlinear, autonomous dynamical system:
sˆ−i(k + 1) = A1−isˆ−i(k), (3.8a)
dˆ2i (k + 1) = A
2
i (sˆ−i, k)dˆ
2
i (k), (3.8b)
dˆ1i (k) = Ci(sˆ−i, k)dˆ
2
i (k), (3.8c)
where k ∈ Z := {0, 1, 2, · · · ,∞} is a step, and their initial values at step k = 0 are
set to sˆ−i(0) := s−i, dˆ2i (0) := d
2
i , and dˆ
3
i (0) := d
3
i ∀i ∈ N . Moreover, A1−i ∈ ℜ2×2
is a stable matrix with 0 < α−i < 1 and 0 < β−i < 1, and A2i (sˆ−i, k) ∈ ℜ, and
Ci(sˆ−i, k) ∈ ℜ are state-dependent and time-varying coeﬃcients as follows:
A1−i =
[
α−i β−i
1− α−i 1− β−i
]
,
A2i (sˆ−i, k) =
sˆ−i(a)(k + 1)
sˆ−i(a)(k)
,
Ci(sˆ−i, k) = 1− 1
sˆ−i(a)(k)
,
where sˆ−i(a) ̸= 0 or sˆ−i(a) ̸= 1 ∀i ∈ N holds. Although future information of
sˆ−i(a)(k + 1) appears in matrix A2i of (3.8b), it is possible to compute (3.8b) by
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following the computation of (3.8a). A block diagram of system (3.8) is drawn in
Figure 3.1. Here, we have the following assumption, whose comment will be put on
the end of this subsection.
Assumption 1 dˆ3i are constant, i.e., dˆ
3
i (k + 1) = dˆ
3
i (k) ∀k ∈ Z ∀i ∈ N .
The first contribution of this thesis is the following theorem about a theoretical
property of the update rule (3.8).
Theorem 1 Assumption 1 holds. Suppose there exists an initial state where sˆ(0)
is an NE of G(N ,A, Ui). Then, sˆ(k) yielded by update rule (3.8) is an NE of
G(N ,A, Ui) for all k ∈ Z.
Proof 2 We use mathematical induction to check whether the autonomous system
(3.8) is a realization of such a map. The extended variables at step k are denoted as
dˆji (k) and sˆ−i(k) ∀i ∈ N ∀k ∈ Z, where Z is a set of non-negative integers. If we
set pairs (dˆji (0), sˆ−i(0)) = (d
j
i , s−i) ∀j ∈ J ∀i ∈ N at k = 0 using NE s, then the
initial pairs satisfy the equations in (3.6). Next, it is assumed that at step k ∈ Z,
the following equations
dˆ3i (k)sˆ−i(a)(k) + dˆ
2
i (k) = 0 ∀i ∈ N , (3.9)
hold. Then, using system (3.8), we will confirm whether the equations at step k + 1
are equal to zero, that is, whether the following is ture:
dˆ3i (k + 1)sˆ−i(a)(k + 1) + dˆ
2
i (k + 1) = 0 ∀i ∈ N . (3.10)
The left hand side of (3.10) is written in terms of variables at step k using (3.10)
and (3.8a) as follows:
dˆ3i (k + 1)sˆ−i(a)(k + 1) + dˆ
2
i (k + 1)
= dˆ3i (k) (α−isˆ−i(a)(k) + β−isˆ−i(a)(k)) +
sˆ−i(a)(k + 1)
sˆ−i(a)(k)
dˆ2i (k),
= dˆ3i (k) (α−isˆ−i(a)(k) + β−isˆ−i(a)(k))+
α−isˆ−i(a)(k) + β−isˆ−i(a)(k)
sˆ−i(a)(k)
dˆ2i (k),
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and by arranging the above with sˆ−i(a)(k) = 1− sˆ−i(a)(k), the following is given:
= α−i
(
dˆ3i (k)sˆ−i(a)(k) + dˆ
2
i (k)
)
+
β−i
(
dˆ3i (k)sˆ−i(a)(k) +
sˆ−i(a)(k)
sˆ−i(a)(k)
dˆ2i (k)
)
= α−i
(
dˆ3i (k)sˆ−i(a)(k) + dˆ
2
i (k)
)
+
β−i
(
dˆ3i (k) (1− sˆ−i(a)(k)) +
1− sˆ−i(a)(k)
sˆ−i(a)(k)
dˆ2i (k)
)
= α−i
(
dˆ3i (k)sˆ−i(a)(k) + dˆ
2
i (k)
)
+
β−i
(
1− sˆ−i(a)(k)
sˆ−i(a)(k)
)(
dˆ3i (k)sˆ−i(a)(k) + dˆ
2
i (k)
)
=
(
α−i − β−i + β−i
sˆ−i(a)(k)
)(
dˆ3i (k)sˆ−i(a)(k) + dˆ
2
i (k)
)
As the second column of the right hand side is the same as (3.9), we can see that
equations (3.10) hold. Therefore, under 0 < s−i(a) < 1 ∀i ∈ N , it is guaranteed
that sˆ−i updated by the dynamical system (3.8) holds equation (3.6) for all the steps.
This terminates the proof of Theorem 1.
3.2.2 Stability Analysis
The presented update rule has the following feature.
Lemma 2 Trajectories of sˆ−i(k) and dˆ2i (k) in (3.8) converge.
Proof 3 As the eigenvalues of matrix A1−i in (3.8a) are located inside a unit circle,
sˆ−i(k) converges as k increases. In other words, there is a suﬃciently large number
N ∈ Z such that sˆ−i(n+ 1) = sˆ−i(n) ∀n > N . Then, A2i (sˆ−i, k) in (3.8b) converges
to one, as follows:
lim
k→∞
sˆ−i(a)(k + 1)
sˆ−i(a)(k)
= lim
n(>N)→∞
sˆ−i(a)(n+ 1)
sˆ−i(a)(n)
→ 1.
Therefore, dˆ2i converges and from dˆ
1
i = dˆ
3
i + dˆ
2
i , dˆ
1
i converges as well.
Lemma 2 states that the autonomous system (3.8) is stable, but it does not say
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Fig. 3.1: A block diagram of the presented update rule (3.8).
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where to converge. In the next subsection, feedback of the NE sˆ at step k is employed
to achieve the desired NE s¯.
3.3 Numerical Calculation Algorithm
This section presents a computational algorithm for the utility design problem.
The procedure to obtain the algorithm is based on a control-theoretic design frame-
work. We have already considered a mathematical model of dynamics of a plant to
be controlled. Next, we design an appropriate PI controller is designed to create a
tracking control system. Then, the resulting control system is rewritten in the form
of the computational algorithm, which is the main contribution of this thesis.
3.3.1 Tracking Control System Design
To achieve the desired NE, we design a control system possessing tracking per-
formance. For evaluating how far away sˆ−i(k) is at step k from the desired s¯−i, we
introduce an error between them, defined by ei(k) := s¯−i − sˆ−i(k) ∈ ℜ2, for the
sake of simplicity, the error, the summation of error and related design parameters
(gains) are expressed by using i instead of −i. Then, the following PI controller is
considered:
xi(k + 1) = xi(k) + ei(k), (3.11a)
u−i(k) = KiIx
i(k) +KiP e
i(k), (3.11b)
where xi ∈ ℜ2 is a controller’s state with xi(0) = 0; KiP ∈ ℜ2×2 and KiI ∈ ℜ2×2 are
design parameters (gains); an input of the controller is the error, and an output of
it, denoted as u−i ∈ ℜ2, is a control input to system (3.8). In order to integrate
controller (3.11) with system (3.8), system (3.8a) is updated to the following:
sˆ−i(k + 1) = A1−isˆ−i(k) + Bu−i(k), (3.12)
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where B :=
[
1 0
−1 0
]
and (3.8b)–(3.8c) remain unchanged. The whole system ob-
tained by gathering (3.12), (3.8b)–(3.8c), and (3.11), is called a PI control system,
and its block diagram is drawn in Figure 3.2. As the control system is viewed as a
computation algorithm, the utility design algorithm is presented in Algorithm 1,
and a theoretical attribute of the proposed algorithm is summarized as the following
theorem.
Theorem 2 Assumption 1 holds. For the normal-form game G, together with de-
sired NE s¯ and appropriate design parameters KiP and K
i
I , Algorithm 1 outputs the
utility matrix U¯i and additional ∆Ui in a polynomial time, which correspond to the
desired NE s¯.
Proof 4 From the linear systems theory 37), it is well known that feedback error
ei(k) is guaranteed to converge to zero by the proposed control system that consists
of (3.12), (3.8b)–(3.8c), and (3.11) with the appropriate gains, since linear system
(3.12) is stable and the PI controller performs the integral action. Simultaneously,
from Lemma 2, we can see that dˆ2i and dˆ
1
i converge to the corresponding values at
the steady state. Finally, the steps required to complete the proposed algorithm are
finite, and the algorithm is solvable in a polynomial time.
3.4 Numerical Simulation Results
This section numerically confirms that the desired utility matrix U and additional
utility matrix ∆U can be calculated by the proposed algorithm. To do this, we
consider two scenarios: in the first scenario, we set several desired NEs under a
common initial NE and in the second scenario, we set a desired NE, which is common
among several initial NEs. For both scenarios, the following settings are common:
α1 = 0.3, β1 = 0.6, α2 = 0.8, β2 = 0.5, KiP = 1.0× 10−1I2, and KiI = 3.0× 10−1I2,
where I2 denotes an identity matrix of size 2 × 2. MATLAB 2016a was used to
conduct the simulation.
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Algorithm 2 Utility Design Algorithm
1: function Utility Design(s, s¯, Ui, α−i, β−i, KiI , K
i
P )
2: k ← 0
3: sˆ(k)← s
4: xi(k)← 0
5: dˆ3i (k)← d3i
6: dˆ2i (k)← d2i
7: dˆ1i (k)← d1i
8: while sˆ ̸= s do
9: ei(k)← s¯−i − sˆ−i(k)
10: u−i(k)← KiIxi(k) +KiP ei(k)
11: xi(k + 1)← xi(k) + ei(k)
12: sˆ−i(k + 1)← A1−isˆ−i(k) + Bu−i(k)
13: dˆ3i (k + 1)← A3i (sˆ−i, k)dˆ3i (k)
14: dˆ2i (k + 1)← A2i (sˆ−i, k)dˆ2i (k)
15: dˆ1i (k + 1)← Ci(sˆ−i, k + 1)dˆ2i (k + 1)
16: k ← k + 1
17: end while
18: return U i =
[
u11i u
12
i
u11i − dˆ1i (k) u12i − dˆ2i (k)
]
and ∆Ui = U¯i − Ui
19: end function
In the first scenario, for the given utility matrix:
U1 =
[
10 8
10.2 6.2
]
and U2 =
[
6 7
0.4 9.4
]
,
an initial NE and two desired NEs are set:
sˆ(0) :=
[
0.3 0.7 0.9 0.1
]T
and
s :=
[
0.4 0.6 0.5 0.5
]T
,
[
0.8 0.2 0.3 0.7
]T
.
Trajectories of sˆi(k), dˆ1i and dˆ
2
i in this case are shown in Figure 3. In the figure,
colors of the lines are diﬀerent based on the setting. For example, when setting the
pair of sˆ1(0) =
[
0.3 0.7
]T
and s1 =
[
0.4 0.6
]T
, the trajectory is plotted in yellow.
Figure 3(a) shows the trajectories of sˆi(k), and we can see that all of sˆi converges
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to the respective desired NE. Figure 3(b) illustrates the trajectories of dˆ1i and dˆ
2
i
distinguished by a solid line and a chain one, respectively. From the figure showing
the trajectories of dˆ1i and dˆ
2
i , we can see that they converge to certain values while
keeping dˆ3i constant. Then, the proposed algorithm outputs the utility matrix and
the additional utility matrix corresponding to the yellow and red lines:
U¯1 =
[
10 8
11.4 7.4
]
, U¯2 =
[
6 7
4.3411 13.3411
]
,
∆U1 =
[
0 0
1.2 1.2
]
and ∆U2 =
[
0 0
3.9411 3.9411
]
.
In the second scenario, for the given utility matrix:
U1 =
[
10 8
9.1 10.1
]
and U2 =
[
6 7
9.2 6.2
]
when sˆ(0) =
[
0.2 0.8 0.7 0.3
]T
, and
U1 =
[
10 8
7.3 8.3
]
and U2 =
[
6 7
7.6 4.6
]
when sˆ(0) =
[
0.6 0.4 0.1 0.9
]T
, two initial NEs and a desired NE are set:
sˆ(0) :=
[
0.2 0.8 0.7 0.3
]T
,
[
0.6 0.4 0.1 0.9
]T
and
s¯ :=
[
0.5 0.5 0.6 0.4
]T
.
Trajectories of sˆi(k), dˆ1i and dˆ
2
i in this case are shown in Figure 4. In the figure, a
color is the same as that in Figure 3. Figure 4(a) shows the trajectories of sˆi(k),
and we can see that all of sˆi converges to the respective desired NE. Figure 4(b)
expresses the trajectories of dˆ1i and dˆ
2
i , and we can see that they converge to certain
values while keeping dˆ3i constant. Then, the proposed algorithm outputs the utility
Chapter3 Utility design 36
matrix and the additional utility matrix corresponding to the yellow lines:
U¯1 =
[
10 8
8.8 9.8
]
, U¯2 =
[
6 7
7.9992 4.9992
]
,
∆U1 =
[
0 0
1.5 1.5
]
and ∆U2 =
[
0 0
0.3992 0.3992
]
.
Consequently, it is numerically confirmed that the proposed algorithm based on
the PI control system enables us to calculate a utility matrix that achieves the desired
NE, and that the proposedAlgorithm 1 can yield the outputs in a polynomial time.
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Fig. 3.2: A block diagram of the update rule including the PI controller.
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Fig. 3.3: Trajectories of sˆ and dˆ obtained by the proposed utility design algorithm
in the first scenario.
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Fig. 3.4: Trajectories of sˆ and dˆ obtained by the proposed utility design algorithm
in the second scenario.
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Chapter4
Conclusion
This chapter summarizes the thesis and introduces future works.
4.1 Change of proclivity
In Chapter 2, the electricity market model is proposed. The model can achieve
the desired equilibrium by using the persuasive dialogue system. The persuasive dia-
logue system is controlled by an algorithm, which is constructed by the proportional-
integral control method. The numerical simulations confirmed that the electricity
price converges to a desired price even if the electricity company has no precise
information with respect to farm owners’ cost functions. Additionally, the average
electricity price converged to the desired price even when the farm owners proba-
bilistically accepted negotiation via the persuasive dialogue system. A future work
will prove that the electricity price stably converges to a some value.
4.2 Utility design
In Chapter 3, the utility design problem for the strategic game is considered. The
problem is presented as a two-player two-action normal-form game. In this situation,
a game designer is assumed to have a desired NE. However, he/she does not know
the appropriate utility (payoﬀ) to motivate the NE. With respect to the problem,
the utility design algorithm to solve the problem is also proposed. The algorithm
computes a new utility matrix and an incentive matrix of the game that achieves
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the desired NE. The construction of the algorithm is reduced to the control system
design for the nonlinear autonomous system. That is modeling of pair of NE and
the utility table, and using the proportional-integral control method. The numerical
example has confirmed the eﬀectiveness of the proposed algorithm.
A future work will involve determining the system that restricts a kind of a class
of strategic games with respect to a type of criterion to distinguish the game. The
criterion can depend on an actually observed equilibrium. In the present thesis, the
system is capable of generating numerous utility matrices corresponding to the given
NE. However, the actual realization of the utility appears diﬃcult. If the system
realizes the utility, it is possible to discuss a distance between the utility matrices
corresponding to the NE, a reachability of the utility matrix for the given NE, and
the equilibrium selection, which discusses qualities of the equilibrium.
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